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The United States Supreme Court
and Class Arbitration:
A Tragedy of Errors
Gary Born & Claudio Salas*
Over the past decade, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of confusing
and, at times, confused opinions on class arbitration. The tortuous path of these
various decisions has caused substantial uncertainty and an enormous waste of
resources by litigants, courts, and arbitral institutions. Worse, the Court's most
recent decisions threaten to undermine U.S. arbitration law more generally; their
analysis badly misinterprets the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and misconceives
the basic concept of "arbitration" in the United States. These misadventures have
turned a field where the U.S. Supreme Court once pioneered international devel-
opments, in decisions like Mitsubishi Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.] and
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 2 into one where the Court's reasoning stands out as
an example of how not to deal with the arbitral process.3
"Class arbitration" is a relatively recent, and almost entirely American, pro-
cedural mechanism that marries arbitration with the class action procedures of
U.S. litigation.4 The class arbitration mechanism was first used during the 1980s,
when a few state courts began to order arbitrations that would be conducted on a
class basis - permitting claims brought by one party on behalf of large numbers of
* Gary Born is the author of INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2009),
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2010) and other works on international
arbitration and litigation. All views contained in this Essay are the views of the authors alone.
1. 473 U.S. 614, 618-20, 625 (1985) (holding that there is no presumption against arbitration of
statutory claims, in this case antitrust claims, and enforcing an agreement to arbitrate in Japan).
2. 417 U.S. 506, 509-10, 519-20 (1974) (staying federal court litigation to allow arbitration to
proceed in accordance with arbitration clause in international commercial contract).
3. U.S. decisions in the field of arbitration are often closely observed by courts and legislatures
outside the United States. See, e.g, GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 329
(2009) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Prima Paint Copr. v. Conklin Mfg Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967), was later used by the German Bundesgerichtschof); id at 792-95 (noting that the Supreme
Court's findings in Mitsubishi Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc. regarding the abitrability of
antitrust claims were later broadly followed in the European Union). Indeed, in his dissent from the
tribunal's finding of jurisdiction in the first ever ICSID mass arbitration, Georges Abi-Saab noted with
approval the distinctions between bilateral and class arbitration that the U.S. Supreme Court articulated
in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AmmalFeeds Int'i Corp. and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (two cases
discussed infra at Section Ill). Abaclat and Others v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissent-
ing Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab, % 148-53 (Aug. 4, 2011). See also Gabrielle Nater-Bass, Class
Action Arbitration: A New Challenge, 27 ASA BULL. 671, 671-90 (2009); see generally S.I. Strong,
Collective Arbitration Under the DIS Supplementary Rules for Corporate Law Disputes: A European
Form of Class Arbitration, 29 ASA BULL. 45 (2011).
4. In U.S. civil procedure, a class action is a civil suit, often a mass torts or consumer litigation, in
which one or more named plaintiffs represent a large, sometimes indeterminate, number of similarly-
situated individuals in pursuing related claims against one or more defendants. The logic of class
actions is to permit large numbers of comparatively small claims that would not otherwise readily be
pursued to be heard efficiently in a single proceeding. See Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (2002).
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similarly-situated claimants (usually consumers), all having identical arbitration
agreements with the same defendant. For a time, class arbitration seemed destined
to remain a niche phenomenon, largely confined to state courts in California. In
the words of one commentator, class arbitration was a "mythical beast: half litiga-
tion, half arbitration and rarely seen."'
In 2003, however, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared to alter the landscape. It
concluded, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,6 that the question whether an
arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration was an issue that arbitrators, not
courts, were to decide. The Bazzle Court's decision was widely and understanda-
bly interpreted as giving giving both arbitral tribunals and courts to order arbitra-
tions on a class-wide basis: while previously uncommon, class arbitration sight-
ings became frequent in U.S. practice after Bazzle. In due course, more than 300
class arbitrations, involving many billions of dollars in claims, were pending be-
fore the American Arbitration Association (AAA) alone.
A decade later, however, the Supreme Court issued two decisions that per-
formed a fairly complete about-face, effectively overruling its earlier holding in
Bazzle and largely closing the door on class arbitration under the FAA. In Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp, the Court held that class arbitration was
only permissible in contracts that affirmatively provided for this procedure. That
holding substantially undercut both the Court's earlier decision in Bazzle and the
burgeoning growth of class arbitrations. More recently, in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, the Court upheld class waiver provisions in arbitration agreements
against unconscionability challenges.
The result in Concepcion was likely correct, but the uncertainty and waste re-
sulting from the Court's various decisions were both enormous and unnecessary;
equally, the Court's changing and contradictory treatments of class arbitration
reflected poorly on both its institutional competence and commitment to providing
a stable and predictable legal environment for arbitration in the U.S. Of even
more lasting concern is the reasoning in Concepcion, which was both miscon-
ceived and dangerous. With scant consideration, the Court's analysis abandoned
the conception of "arbitration" which has prevailed in the U.S. for much of the
20th century - as a process for resolving a wide variety of disputes, using an equal-
ly wide range of procedures, depending on the parties' individual needs and objec-
tives. In its place, Concepcion concluded that the FAA only protected the type of
arbitration prevalent in 1925 (quaintly conceived of as informal, small-stakes,
bipartite proceedings).
This concept of "arbitration," and of the FAA, is fundamentally wrong. In
fact, arbitration is, and has long been, a highly diverse form of dispute resolution,
routinely including very formal, very large and very complicated multi-party pro-
ceedings. The contrary suggestion in Concepcion is incorrect and, taken serious-
ly, would deny the FAA's protections to a wide range of different forms of arbi-
tration, both domestic and international. That is clearly neither what Congress
5. Kelly Thompson Cochran & Eric Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer Arbitration, 60 Bus.
LAW. 785, 791 (2005).
6. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
7. 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010).
8. 131 S.Ct 1740, 1753 (2011).
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A Tragedy of Errors
intended in enacting the FAA nor what sound policy calls for; it is hopefully also
not what the Court intended, despite its apparent analysis in Concepcion.
This Essay describes and critiques the U.S. Supreme Court's recent misad-
ventures with class arbitration. First, the Essay reviews the origins and rise of
class arbitration under the FAA, particularly following the Supreme Court's
Bazzle decision. In Part II, the Essay discusses application of the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine to class action waivers, under the California courts' Discover Bank
doctrine. In Part III, the Essay recounts the Supreme Court's retrenchment from
class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen and, more fully, in Concepcion. It also critiques
the Court's apparent analysis in Concepcion and offers an alternative analysis for
the Concepcion result that is more consistent with the FAA and its purposes.
I. THE ORIGINS OF CLASS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Class arbitration rarely evokes a neutral response-some herald it as a sensi-
ble, efficient alternative to cumbersome class litigation, while others oppose it
variously as a means of denying consumers and others the procedural rights they
would enjoy in litigation or as an unworkable combination of the worst of both
litigation and arbitration.9 It is helpful to summarize briefly the development of
class arbitration and the framework that the FAA provided for that development.
A. Section 2 of the FAA
Section 2 is the cornerstone of the FAA. It provides that an arbitration
agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." ' 0 It is uncontrover-
sial that the purpose of Section 2 is "to make arbitration agreements as enforcea-
ble as other contracts."'
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts have repeatedly held that
Section 2 mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements, doing so across a wide
9. See, e.g., S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are US. Arbitrator Creating Internationally En-
forceable Awards in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1048-49
(2009) (arguing that class arbitration has the potential to enhance efficiency and promote social jus-
tice); Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion
and the Future ofAmerican Arbitration, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1919936 (arguing that in
its recent rulings curtailing class arbitration the Supreme Court "has eliminated key safeguards aimed
at ensuring fundamental fairness to consumers and employees in arbitration"); Thomas Doyle, Protect-
ing Nonparty Class Members in Class Arbitration, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 25, 26-27 (2009)
(declanng that "class actions are an odd fit for arbitration" and expressing concern regarding the rights
of nonparty class members in class arbitrations); David Clancy & Matthew Stein, An Uninvited Guest:
Class Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act's Legislative History, 63 BUs. LAW. 55, 62-63, 67
(2007) (arguing that class arbitration raises serious procedural concerns, that it has never been legisla-
tively or judicially validated, and that "it is by no means clear that it should be validated.") (emphasis
in original).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides: "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter ansing out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy ansing out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 9. U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
I1. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
No. 1] 23
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range of settings. The Supreme Court first fully articulated the modem concep-
tion of the FAA in Southland Corp. v. Keatingl2 - arising, coincidentally, from a
class action litigation.
In Southland, Keating filed a class action suit on behalf of a class of 7-Eleven
franchisees against Southland, the 7-Eleven franchisor, "alleging, among other
things, fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the
California Franchise Investment Law."13  Southland moved to compel multiple
individual arbitrations with each franchisee in accordance with arbitration clauses
in its various franchise agreements.14 After conflicting lower court decisions, the
California Supreme Court held that Section 31512 of the California Franchise
Investment Law required claims under that statute to be brought exclusively in
state courts and that this requirement did not conflict with Section 2 of the FAA. 5
The Southland Court reversed, first holding that the FAA applied to state (as
well as federal) court proceedings. The Court reaffirmed its holding in Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., that the FAA "rests on the
authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause," 6
and quoted its then recent decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Construction Corp. declaring that the FAA "'creates a body of federal sub-
stantive law' . . .applicable in state and federal court." 7 The Court also held that
Section 2 preempted state law rules purporting to declare particular categories of
disputes non-arbitrable: in "creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well
as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to un-
dercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." 8 On this basis, the Court
held that Section 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law was preempt-
ed by Section 2 of the FAA and compelled arbitration between Southland and its
various franchisees.' 9
In subsequent years, the Court repeatedly held that Section 2 of the FAA re-
quired enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a sweeping range of disputes, in-
cluding both state and federal statutory claims of almost every description. In
Perry v. Thomas, for example, the Court held that a California statute prohibiting
the arbitration of wage collection actions was preempted, 20 while in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. the Court held that federal employment discrimina-
tion claims were arbitrable under Title VII. 21 In Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court concluded that federal antitrust claims were
arbitrable.22 Likewise, the Court variously held that agreements to arbitrate feder-
12. 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id. at I1 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
17. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mcm'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)).
18. Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 16-17.
20. 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
21. 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
22. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985).
24 [Vol. 2012
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al RICO claims, 23 California fair employment statutory claims,24 federal truth in
lending statutory claims,25 and Florida truth in lending and usury claims,26 were
all subject to arbitration.
B. Class Arbitration in the U.S. Prior to 2003
The origins of class arbitration in the U.S. began with the same dispute that
ushered in the Court's modem conception of the FAA. Although often over-
looked, the Southland Court had in fact also granted review of the question
"whether arbitration under the FAA is impaired when a class action structure is
imposed on the process by the state courts."27 In the end, however, the Southland
Court did not address this issue, holding that Southland had not contested class
arbitration on federal grounds in the California Supreme Court proceedings.28
The Southland Court thus left undisturbed a prior line of California court de-
cisions regarding class arbitration, which decisions marked the beginning of class
arbitration in the U.S. In California appellate proceedings in the Southland case,
captioned Keating v. Superior Court,29 the 7-Eleven franchisees argued that if the
court were to deem arbitration appropriate, arbitration should proceed on a class
basis rather than individual basis, i.e., that "the trial court should determine the
preliminary issues regarding class certification before the cases are resolved on
their merits." 30  Southland responded that class procedures in arbitration were
impermissible, insisting that its agreements to arbitrate contemplated only indi-
vidual arbitrations. 31 The California appellate court considered the issue "one of
first impression," 32 and concluded that "there is no insurmountable obstacle to
23. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (finding RICO claims
arbitrable and reaffirming the finding in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. that securities claims are arbitra-
ble).
24. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
25. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
26. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
27. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 3.
28. Id. at 17.
29. 167 Cal.Rptr. 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
30. Id. at 490.
31. Id.
32. Id. The first reported cases in the U.S. mentioning class arbitration took place a few years earli-
cr. In a series of three cases, the Georgia Supreme Court first allowed and then rejected class arbitra-
tion of taxpayers' claims against a board of tax assessors. The applicable state statute in these disputes
provided for resolution through arbitration. In Boynton v. Carswell, the taxpayers originally brought
their claims in state trial court, arguing that the arbitral procedure did not provide adequate remedy.
Boynton v. Carswell, 238 Ga. 417 (1977). The Georgia Supreme Court, however, found that the "issue
between each member of the class in these cases and the Joint Board of Assessors [was] identical" and
that therefore there was "no legal or practical reason why this class controversy could not be settled in
a class arbitration." Id. at 419. In the next trip to the Georgia Supreme Court, the tax officials argued
that the state statute that provided the procedures for arbitration did "not provide for class arbitration
for for any procedure applicable to class arbitration." Callaway v. Carswell, 240 Ga. 579, 582 (1978).
The court disagreed, upholding the trial judge's decision to permit class arbitration and to devise pro-
cedures for such arbitration. Id. However, the court determined that it had erred in its prior decision,
and that class arbitration would not be permitted in the future because the issue in question was not,
after all, arbitrable under the state statute. Id. at 583. The court reaffirmed this finding in Nw. Civic
Assoc., Inc. v. Cates, and there, apparently, Georgia's experimentation with class arbitration ended.
Nw. Civic Assoc., Inc. v. Cates, 241 Ga. 39 (1978)
25No. 1] A Tragedy of Errors
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conducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis. In an appropriate case, it would
undoubtedly be the fairest and most efficient way of resolving the parties' dis-
pute."
On appeal, the California Supreme Court came to the same conclusion. The
Court's analysis began from the premise that class action is an important device
for vindicating the rights of large groups of persons and that adhesion contracts
present an ideal setting for class actions. The Court described class arbitration as
a way "to give expression to the basic arbitration commitment of the parties."34
The California Supreme Court saw class arbitration as a solution that honored an
agreement to arbitrate without denying parties to an adhesion contract their rights
to pursue class action remedies:
An adhesion contract is not a normal arbitration setting, however, and
what is at stake is not some abstract institutional interest but the interests
of the affected parties. Classwide arbitration, as Sir Winston Churchill
said about democracy, must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal
but in relation to its alternatives. If the alternatives in a case of this sort
is to force hundreds of individual franchisees each to litigate its cause
with Southland in separate arbitral forum, then the prospect of classwide
arbitration, for all its difficulties, may offer a better, more efficient, and
fairer solution. Where that is so, and gross unfairness would result from
the denial of opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis, then an order
structuring arbitration on that basis would be justified.35
After the California Supreme Court's decision in Keating, California state courts
ordered class arbitration in a wide variety of circumstances.3 6
Despite these developments, it initially appeared that class arbitration would
remain a state court phenomenon confined almost exclusively to California.3 7
Courts in at least three other states rejected the possibility of class arbitration.3 8
At the same time, federal courts generally balked at ordering class arbitration
when it was not expressly provided for in the arbitration agreement. 39
33. Keating,167 Cal.Rptr. at 492.
34. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 610 (1982).
35. Id.
36. See e.g. Lewis v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 179 Cal.App.3d 935, 946 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 86 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Anesthesia Care
Assocs. Med. Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross of California, No. 986677, 994846, 2002 WL 484662, at *7
(Cal. Sup. Feb. 25, 2002); Sanders v. Kinko's, Inc., 99 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1113-1114 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); Garcia v. Directv, No. Bl58570, 2002 WL 31769224, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002).
37. State courts in Pennsylvania and South Carolina followed the California state courts' approach.
See Dickler v. Hearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Bazzle v. Green
Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, (S.C. 2002).
38. See Steinberg v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 12 Del J. Corp. L. 371, 380 (Del. Ch. 1986) (find-
ing that ordering class arbitration was impermissibly "rewriting the contract"); Med Center Cars, Inc.
v. Smith, 727 So.2d 9 (Ala. 1998); Stein v. Geoncrco, Inc., 17 P.3d 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). The
court in Steinberg distinguished the California Supreme Court's opinion in Keating by stating, wrong-
ly, that "the United States Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether [class
arbitration] is permissible under the Federal Arbitration Act." Steinberg, 12 Del. J. Corp. L. at 380 n.5.
39. See e.g. Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F.Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993) (finding the
court had no authority to order class arbitration because it had to "give effect to the agreement of the
parties, and this arbitration agreement makes no provision for class treatment of disputes.").
26 [Vol. 2012
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The leading federal court decision was that of the Seventh Circuit in Champ
v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., which refused to order class arbitration where the par-
ties had not specifically agreed upon it.40 The Champ court held that the "overrid-
ing goal of the FAA was to place private arbitration agreements on the same foot-
ing as other contracts negotiated between private parties,"41 even if doing so creat-
ed "possible inefficienciesA 2 or "piecemeal litigation."A3  The court rejected the
argument that if "an order compelling class arbitration would not contradict the
terms of an arbitration... would still be in accordance with those terms as required
by Section 4 of the FAA,"4 instead holding that class arbitration would only be
compelled if affirmatively authorized by the parties' agreement to arbitration.45
Given that the vast majority of arbitration agreements did not provide expressly
for class arbitration, Champ appeared to seal the status of class arbitration, at least
outside of California, as "a mythical beast . .. rarely seen."
C. Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle
In 2003, a sharply-divided decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Green Tree
Financial Corp v. Bazzle dramatically changed the landscape for class arbitrations
- at least for a time. In Bazzle, a putative class of homeowners brought a state-
court class action against Green Tree Financial Corporation alleging that home
improvement loans it had issued violated the South Carolina Consumer Protection
Code. 46 Green Tree objected to class certification and sought to compel arbitra-
tion. The trial court both certified a class action and compelled arbitration.47 The
arbitrator, "administering the case as a class arbitration, eventually awarded the
class $10,935,000 in statutory damages" plus attorney fees. 48 A similar class arbi-
40. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
41. Id. at 275.
42. Id. at 275 (quoting United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1993)).
43. Id. at 277 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
44. Id. at 274. 9 U.S.C. § 4 provides, inter alia, that in light of "a written agreement for arbitration
... courts shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accord-
ance with the terms thereof." 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2011).
45. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275. For reasons similar to those of Champ, California federal district courts
also took the view that they could not order class arbitration if an arbitration agreement did not specifi-
cally provide for such procedure. See e.g. McCarthy v. Providential Corp., 122 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th
Cir.1997); Gray v. Conseco, Inc., No. SACV000322, 2001 WL 1081347, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6,
2001); Bischoffv. Directv, Inc., 180 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
46. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447-49 (2003).
47. Id. at 449.
48. Id. The arbitration agreement between Green Tree and its customers provided the following
terms:
ARBITRATION-All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract or
the relationships which result from this contract ... shall be resolved by binding arbitration by
one arbitrator selected by us with consent ofyou. This arbitration contract is made pursuant to a
transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9
U.S.C. section I....THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY
RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION
UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A COURT ACTION BY U.S. (AS PROVIDED
HEREIN) .... The parties agree and understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided
by the law and the contract. These powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, includ-
ing, but not limited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief.
No. 1] 27
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tration against Green Tree involving mobile homes resulted in an award of
$9,200,000 in statutory damages plus attorneys' fees. Green Tree appealed both
cases on the grounds that, among other things, "class arbitration was legally im-
permissible." 49
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that the two cases presented "the
same novel issue: whether class-wide arbitration is permissible when the arbitra-
tion agreement between the parties is silent regarding class actions."50 The court
summarized the state of the law governing class arbitration, noting that the U.S.
Supreme Court had declined to rule on the issue in Southland and that courts in
other jurisdictions had taken different approaches:
Several federal circuits have precluded class-wide arbitration when the
arbitration agreement is silent based on their interpretation of Section 4
of the FAA. Representing the opposing view, the California courts have
permitted class-wide arbitration on a case by case basis when the arbitra-
tion agreement is silent.5 1
The South Carolina court adopted the California position, holding "that class-wide
arbitration may be ordered when the arbitration agreement is silent if it would
serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in prejudice."52 The Court rea-
soned:
If we enforced a mandatory, adhesive arbitration clause, but prohibited
class actions in arbitration where the agreement is silent, the drafting par-
ty could effectively prevent class actions against it without having to say
it was doing so in the agreement .... Under those circumstances, parties
with nominal claims, but significant collective claims, would be left with
no avenue for relief and the drafting party with no check on its abuses of
the law. Further, hearing such claims (involving identical issues against
one defendant) individually, in court or before an arbitrator, does not
serve the interest of judicial economy.53
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case for review. In a badly-fragmented
set of opinions, captioned Green Tree Financial Corp v. Bazzle, the Court re-
versed and remanded. For better or worse, the various opinions in Bazzle opened
the doors to the rapid, robust development of class arbitration.
Justice Breyer's plurality opinion in Bazzle initially considered whether the
South Carolina Supreme Court had correctly decided that the parties' arbitration
agreement was silent on the issue of class arbitration or whether the agreement in
Id. at 448 (emphasis and capitalization as found in the opinion, where emphasis was added and capital-
ization was from the original).
49. Id. at 444.
50. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 351 (S.C. 2002).
51. Id. at 356 (identifying Champ as the seminal Court of Appeals decision and Keating as the
seminal California state court decision).
52. Id. at 360.
53. Id. at 360-61.
[Vol. 201228
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fact, as Green Tree contended, forbade class arbitration. 54 The plurality concluded
that it was not for the courts to decide this question and therefore did not adopt
either party's interpretation of the arbitration agreement. Rather, the plurality
concluded that this question- whether the arbitration clause authorized class arbi-
tration - was for the arbitrators, not the courts, to decide. According to the plu-
rality, this question did not fall within the category of "gateway matters" (such as
the validity of an arbitration agreement and other "arbitrability" issues) that are for
courts to determine, absent clear agreement to the contrary." Rather, the plurality
thought the question whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration
"concerns contract interpretation and arbitration procedures. Arbitrators are well
situated to answer that question."56
Technically, the Bazzle plurality did not reach the question of whether the
FAA permits class arbitration where an arbitration agreement is silent. Conceiva-
bly, on remand, an arbitrator could have found the arbitration agreement silent on
the issue and ordered class arbitration, only for a court, in a subsequent action to
vacate, to hold that class arbitration was impermissible under the FAA. Under the
plurality's analysis, however, that result appeared very unlikely: having catego-
rized the question of class arbitration as a matter of contract interpretation and
arbitration procedures, not a gateway issue of arbitrability, the plurality strongly
suggested that decisions on these questions by arbitral tribunals would be subject
only to the very limited judicial review generally available for such issues.5 7
That conclusion was bolstered by Justice Stevens' opinion, concurring in the
judgment. Justice Stevens wrote that the plurality's opinion was "close to [his]
own" and that he concurred so that there would be a controlling opinion. None-
theless, Justice Stevens would have affirmed the South Carolina Supreme Court
on other grounds - in particular, because he thought that its decision was "correct
as matter of law."59 Justice Stevens reasoned:
The Supreme Court of South Carolina had held as a matter of state law
that class-action arbitrations are permissible if not prohibited by the ap-
plicable agreement, and that the agreement between these parties is silent
on the issue . . . There is nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act that pre-
cludes either of these determinations by the Supreme Court of South
Carolina. 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent disagreed with the plurality as to who
should decide whether the parties' arbitration clause permitted class arbitration,
opining that "the determination is one for the courts, not arbitrator."6 1  Justice
Rehnquist also disagreed with Justice Steven's concurrence, going on to conclude
54. Green Tree Financial Corp., 539 U.S. at 447.
55. Id. at 453.
56. Id.
57. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995), Nat'1 Postal Mail
Handlers Union v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 589 F.3d 437, 441-42 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Burlington N.
and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pub. Scrv. Co. of Okla., 636 F.3d 562, 567-68 (10th Cir. 2010).
58. Green Tree Financial Corp., 539 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J. concurring and dissenting).
59. Id. at 455.
60. Id. at 454-55.
61. Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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that "the holding of the Supreme Court of South Carolina contravenes the terms of
the contracts and is therefore pre-empted by the FAA."62 On his reading, the arbi-
tration agreements at issue permitted parties to choose an arbitrator for each indi-
vidual contract and set of claims, a requirement that would be contravened by a
single arbitrator hearing all claims by all class members in a single arbitration. In
other words, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the express terms of the parties'
arbitration agreements foreclosed class arbitration; he did not address the question
whether class arbitration would be permissible when the arbitration agreement
was silent on the issue. 63
Predictably, the Court's 2003 decision in Bazzle produced a dramatic increase
in the use of class arbitration. With Champ no longer barring the way, arbitrators
across the U.S. were free to determine whether particular arbitration agreements
permitted class arbitration - so long as the procedure was not expressly forbidden
by the arbitration agreement - and they frequently concluded that the agreements
impliedly permitted class arbitrations." At the same time, arbitral institutions
moved to adopt rules for class arbitration, with both the AAA and JAMS quickly
issuing class arbitration rules.6 5 By 2011, the AAA had approximately three hun-
dred class arbitrations on its docket,66 while JAMS administered a substantial
number of additional arbitrations on a class-wide basis.
62. Id.
63. Justice Rehnquist's opinion suggested, however, that he would interpret most arbitration agree-
ments as expressly forbidding class arbitration (given his view of the parties' right to select different
arbitrators for disputes under individual contracts and their respective arbitration agreements).
64. See e.g. Rollins, Inc. v. Garrett, 176 Fcd.Appx. 968 (11 th Cir. 2006); Dealer Computer Scrvs.,
Inc. v. Champion Ford, No. 07-13174, 2008 WL 205249 (E.D.Mich. Jan. 24, 2008); JSC Surgutnefte-
gaz v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, No. 04 Civ 6069(RMB), 2007 WL 3019234
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. I1, 2007); see generally Alan Scott Rau, Power and the Limits of Contract: The New
Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 435 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1938565 (page numbers follow PDF) ("Bazzle was immediately taken to
be an endorsement by the Court of a new norm of classwide arbitrations.").
65. In its policy on class arbitrations, the AAA explained its reasons for adopting class arbitration
rules as follows:
On October 8, 2003, in response to the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, the American Arbitration Association issued its Supplementary Rules for
Class Arbitrations to govern proceedings brought as class arbitrations. In Bazzle, the Court held
that, where an arbitration agreement was silent regarding the availability of class-wide relief, an
arbitrator, and not a court, must decide whether class relief is permitted. Accordingly, the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association will administer demands for class arbitration pursuant to is Supple-
mentary Rules for Class Arbitrations if (1) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes aris-
ing out of the parties' agreement shall be resolved in accordance with the Association's rules, and
(2) the agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims.
See AAA Policy On Class Arbitrations, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.aspid=28779. See also
Kelly Thompson Cochran & Eric Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer Arbitration, 60 Bus. LAW.
785, 792 (2005); S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Actions in the International Sphere, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L.
1, 36-37 (2008).
66. AAA Class Action Docket, available at www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22563 (last visited on May 27,
2011). A Westlaw search of U.S. federal and state court cases reveals 63 cases referencing "class
arbitration," "classwide arbitration" or "class action arbitration" prior to Bazzle and 550 such cases
post-Bazzle.




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2012, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2012/iss1/3
A Tragedy of Errors
II. DISCOVER BANK V. SUPERIOR COURT OFLOS ANGELES:
UNCONSCIONABLITY AND CLASS ARBITRATION
In the wake of Bazzle, many businesses took steps to avoid class arbitration.
In particular, franchisee, employee, and consumer contracts routinely incorporated
express and often detailed class action waivers into their arbitration provisions.
The objective was to ensure that these arbitration agreements could only be inter-
preted to require individual arbitrations, not class arbitrations.
In response, however, California state courts, and subsequently other state
courts, applied the unconscionability doctrine to deny enforcement of class action
waivers. This approach was first taken in Szetela v. Discover Bank by the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal. 69 There, the arbitration clause provided: "Neither you nor
we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims in arbitration by or against other
card members with respect to other accounts or arbitrate any claims as a repre-
sentative or member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity." The
California court held the clause unconscionable:
The clause is not only harsh and unfair to Discover customers who might
be owed a relatively small sum of money, but it also serves as a disincen-
tive for Discover to avoid the type of conduct that might lead to class ac-
tion litigation in the first place. By imposing this clause on its customers,
Discover has essentially granted itself a license to push the boundaries of
good business practice to their furthest limits, fully aware that relatively
few, if any, customers will seek legal remedies, and that any remedies
obtained will only pertain to that single customer without collateral es-
toppel effect. The potential for millions of customers to be overcharged
without an effective method of redress cannot be ignored. Therefore, the
provision violates fundamental notions of fairness.70
As a result, the court invalidated the waiver provision of the arbitration agreement,
leaving the parties to class arbitration (or class litigation, if the class action waiver
were held non-severable from the agreement to arbitrate).71  Szetela was not pre-
sented with, and did not address, the effects of the FAA on the question of class
arbitration. This issue was left for the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank
v. Superior Court ofLos Angeles.72
68. See, e g., Samuel Estrcicher & Steven C. Bennett, Using Express No-Class Action Provisions to
Halt Class-Claims, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2005, at 3 ("In response to Bazzle, and the non-trivial risk that
an arbitrator will entertain class or collective actions in the absence of such a clause, many employers
have begun incorporating explicit 'no-class action' clauses into their employment alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) programs."); Laurence Z. Shickman, Stephen S. Harvey & Angelo A. Stio, Another
Federal Circuit Knocks Out Class Action Waiver Provisions in Arbitration Agreement Based on Public
Policy Under Federal Antitrust Laws, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 169, 266 (2008) ("Numerous
companies responded to Bazzle by revising their standard arbitration agreements to expressly prohibit
class arbitration.").
69. 97 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1099-1102 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
70. Id. at 1101.
71. Id. at 1102.
72. 36 Cal.4th 148, 163-64 (2005)
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The same class waiver provision found in Szetela was also at issue in Discov-
er Bank. In Discover Bank, however, the California Court of Appeal held that the
California rule prohibiting class waivers in arbitration agreements, announced in
Szetela, was preempted by the FAA.n On appeal, the California Supreme Court
considered whether the waiver was unconscionable and, if so, whether the FAA
preempted the Szetela rule.
The California Supreme Court first noted that California courts had held
waivers of class action rights contrary to California law in both the litigation and
the arbitration contexts. The court emphasized the importance of class action
lawsuits in protecting consumers by deterring fraudulent practices from business
enterprises and avoiding the burden of duplicative litigation involving identical
claims. 74 The court also reasoned that contractual waivers of class actions allow
wrongdoers to retain the benefits of their misdeeds. The court then announced
the following generally applicable rule of unconscionability with regard to class
waivers:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a set-
ting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve
small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,
then, at least to the extent the obligation at issue is governed by Califor-
nia law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or prop-
erty of another.
The court also held that the FAA did not preempt California's unconsciona-
bility rule. The court's analysis focused on Perry v. Thomas," where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a section of the California Labor
Code that authorized suit for the collection of wages "without regard to the exist-
ence of any private agreement to arbitrate."78 According to the California Su-
preme Court, the Perry decision made "the critical distinction . . . between 'a
state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to
arbitrate is at issue,' which is preempted by the FAA, and a state law that 'gov-
ern[s] issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts
generally,' which is not."79 Applying this distinction, the California Supreme
Court found that California's unconscionability rule prohibiting class action waiv-
ers was not preempted by the FAA because "it applie[d] equally to class action
litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class
arbitration waivers in contracts with such agreements."80
73. Id. at 153.
74. Id. at 156.
75. Id. at 157.
76. Id. at 162-63 (internal quotc and citation onitted).
77. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
78. 482 U.S. at 484, 491.
79. 36 Cal.4th at 165 (quoting Perry, 482 U.S., at 493 n.9).
80. Id. at 165-66.
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After Bazzle and Discover Bank, a substantial number of state and federal
courts held that class action waivers were, at least in certain circumstances, un-
conscionable and, as a consequence, that class arbitrations would be compelled.
These decisions concluded not only that class arbitrations would be compelled
where arbitration agreements were silent on the issue, but also where arbitration
agreements invalidly barred class arbitration, through use of an unconscionable
class action waiver. Following Discover Bank, class arbitration continued the
robust growth that had begun with the Supreme Court's Bazzle decision.82
III. STOLT-NIELSEN AND CONCEPCION: AN ABOUT-FACE AND A
FUNDAMENTAL ANALYTICAL MISTAKE
The U.S. Supreme Court's approach to class arbitration shifted dramatically
in two recent decisions - Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,8 decided
in 2010, and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 8 decided in 2011. The Court's
two decisions apparently executed an almost complete about-face from the treat-
ment of class arbitration in Bazzle. At the same time, the Court's analysis also
unnecessarily adopted, albeit apparently in dicta, a profoundly misconceived and
erroneous view of both the "fundamental" character of arbitration and the scope of
the FAA's protections. Taken seriously, which is difficult to imagine, these views
would seriously jeopardize U.S. arbitration law and the efficacy of the FAA.
A. Stolt-Nielsen: Silent Arbitration Clauses
Do Not Permit Class Arbitration
Like Bazzle, Stolt-Nielsen presented the question whether arbitration clauses
that were silent on the issue permitted class arbitration. As discussed above, the
Supreme Court had concluded in Bazzle that the question whether such clauses
permitted class arbitration was for arbitrators to decide. In Stolt-Nielsen, however,
the Supreme Court largely reversed course, holding that courts could, after all,
determine whether an arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration, at least in
the context of a vacatur action, and that "silent" arbitration clauses did not permit
class arbitration.
81. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 100-03 (N.J. 2006);
Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (111. 2006); Thibodcau v. Comeast Corp., 912
A.2d 874, 882-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006); Cottonwood Fin., Ltd. v. Estes, 325 Wis.2d 749, 764-66 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2010); Picardi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 251 P.3d 723, 726-728 (Nev. 2011); Cooper v. QC
Fin. Servs., Inc., 503 F.Supp.2d 1266, 1286-1290 (D. Arizona 2007) (applying Arizona law); Dale v.
Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1223-1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying Georgia law); Skirchak v. Dy-
namics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 58-60 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying Massachusetts law).
82. The path to class arbitration, however, was not completely smooth, as evidenced by the misad-
ventures of JAMS with the issue. Initially, JAMS determined that it would not enforce class waivers
in arbitration agreements and would require that they be waived. It subsequently withdrew this policy,
acknowledging that court decisions on the validity of such clauses varied by jurisdiction. Kelly
Thompson Cochran & Eric Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer Arbitration, 60 Bus. LAw. 785,
793-94 (2005).
83. 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
84. 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
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Unlike most class arbitration cases, the dispute in Stolt-Nielsen involved so-
phisticated businesses (and an international setting). AnimalFeeds supplied raw
ingredients to animal-feed producers around the world,85 while Stolt-Nielsen was
a world-wide ocean shipping company. AnimalFeeds brought a class arbitration
against Stolt-Nielsen and similar shipping companies asserting antitrust claims
(based on allegedly illegal price fixing by ocean shippers). The arbitration
agreement in the AnimalFeeds-Stolt-Nielsen contract was silent on whether class
arbitration was permitted. 8
The arbitral tribunal in Stolt-Nielsen had considered whether class arbitration
was permissible, given a silent arbitration agreement, and determined that it was.
As the Court understood it, however, the arbitral tribunal had not actually inter-
preted the arbitration agreements in making this determination. The Court con-
cluded that the arbitral tribunal instead had "simply imposed its own conception of
sound policy" based on the perception of "a post-Bazzle consensus among arbitra-
tors that class arbitration is beneficial in 'a wide variety of settings."'89 In Justice
Alito's view, "the panel proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law
court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in such a situation."90
As a consequence, the Court held that the arbitrators' decision to proceed with
class arbitration exceeded their authority, requiring that their award be vacated.9'
The Court then went on to "establish the rule to be applied in deciding wheth-
er class arbitration is permitted." 92 The Court first noted that a "foundational FAA
principle" is that "arbitration is a matter of consent." 93 It then found that compel-
ling class arbitration simply because the parties' agreement did not preclude it was
"fundamentally at war" with this principle. 94 The Court reasoned that class arbi-
tration is not a term that can be "infer[red] solely from the fact of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate," 95 because "class-action arbitration changes the nature of
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed that the parties consented to
it by simply agreeing to submit their dispute to an arbitrator."96
85. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1764.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1765.
88. Id. at 1766.
89. Id. at 1769. It is difficult to see the basis for the Stolt-Nielsen Court's conclusion that the arbitral
tribunal had not in fact interpreted the parties' arbitration agreements and had instead "simply imposed
its own conception of sound policy." Id. In fact, whatever one thinks about the correctness of their
analysis, the arbitrators' award performed a relatively unexceptional examination of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate.
90. Id. at 1769.
91. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776.
92. Id. at 1772. The Court explained that Bazzle had "left that question open." Id. As described
above, this assessment of Bazzle is technically correct, but the much more obvious interpretation was
that the Bazzle Court permitted class arbitration in circumstances when the arbitration agreement was
silent on the issue. Certainly, this was the meaning divined by the AAA and JAMS, hundreds of
litigants and multiple courts.
93. Id. at 1775.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court added that "[in bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and appel-
late reviews of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution." Id. As dis-
cussed below, this view of the "procedural rigor" of arbitration would subsequently find greater voice
in Justice Scalia's opinion in Concepcion.
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Based on these considerations, the Court concluded that an arbitration agree-
ment would not be interpreted to permit class arbitration unless it is clear that "the
parties agreed to authorize class arbitration."97 In other words, the parties must
have affirmatively, and likely explicitly, addressed the issue. 98 That decision al-
most entirely undid the results in Bazzle, which had apparently left to arbitrators
the largely unreviewable authority of determining whether particular arbitration
agreements permitted class arbitration. In its place, Stolt-Nielsen held that the
availability of class arbitration was a matter for de novo judicial determination in
a vacatur action (and, very likely, also in an action to compel arbitration); 99 at the
same time, the Court also held that silent arbitration clauses could no longer be
used as the basis for class arbitrations under the FAA.
B. Concepcion: The FAA Preempts State Unconscionability Rules
Against Class Arbitration Waivers
In late April of 2011, eight years after its decision in Bazzle opened the door
to class arbitration, the Supreme Court almost entirely closed that door. In its
eagerness to reverse course, however, the Court adopted an obviously mistaken
definition of "arbitration," and conception of the FAA more broadly, which
would, if given effect, do serious damage to U.S. arbitration law.
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, Vincent and Liza Concepcion, cus-
tomers of AT&T, filed a complaint alleging that the company had defrauded them
by charging sales tax (about $30) on phones advertised as free; the Concepcions'
complaint was later consolidated with a class action on behalf of other cell phone
users.'" AT&T sought dismissal of the claims brought against it by both the
Concepcions and other class members, moving to compel individual arbitrations
pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in AT&T's cell phone contracts with
97. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776 (emphasis in original).
98. The Court did, arguably, leave the door open for arbitrators to find implicit consent to class
arbitration if the applicable rule of law "contains a 'default rule' under which an arbitration clause is
construed as allowing class arbitration in the absence of express consent." Id. at 1768-69.
99. The Court noted that in Bazzle the plurality, rather than the majority, had determined that "an
arbitrator, not a court, [must] decide whether a contract permits class arbitration." Id. at 1772. While
evidently skeptical of this notion, the Court stated that it did not need revisit the question because the
parties had "expressly assigned this issue to the arbitration panel." Id. Lower courts have thus been
left with no meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue. In Central West Virginia
Energy, Inc. v. Bayer Cropscience LP, the court noted that Stolt-Nielsen "specifically declined to
address whether it was for a court or an arbitrator to decide the issue of consent to class arbitration,"
and thus the court refused to overrule an earlier fourth circuit decision holding that only questions
whether the parties had decided to arbitrate "at all" were for the courts to decide. 645 F.3d 267, 275
n.7 (4th Cir. 2011). Another federal court, noting the contradictory opinions in Bazzle and Stolt-
Nielsen, stated that "[w]ithout clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the Court is left with Eighth
Circuit precedent which indicates that it is appropriate for the Court, not an arbitrator, to resolve [the
class arbitration] question." Mork v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., Civ. No. 11-2069 (MJD/FLN), 2012
WL 38628, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2012). A third federal court, however, followed the plurality opin-
ion in Bazzle, noting that Stolt-Nielsen "did not decide the threshold issue," and therefore "con-
clude[d]... that the ability of a class to arbitrate a dispute where the parties contest whether the agree-
ment to arbitrate is silent or ambiguous on the issue is a procedural question that is for the arbitrator to
decide." Guida v. Home Say. of Am., Inc., 793 F.Supp.2d 611, 616 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
100. 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
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its customers.10 1 The clause required arbitration of all disputes between AT&T
and each of its customers; it also contained a class action waiver providing that all
claims be brought in the parties' "individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding."102 In addition,
the arbitration clause provided (if any doubt remained) that "the arbitrator may not
consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over
any form of a representative or class proceeding." 03
Despite these provisions, the Concepcions argued that they were free to pur-
sue a class action, on the grounds that their class action waiver was unenforceable
under the California Supreme Court's decision in Discover Bank. Applying that
decision's rule, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
AT&T's motion to compel individual arbitrations, holding that the class action
waiver was unconscionable and, therefore, permitting the Concepcion's class
action litigation to proceed.'
The lower courts were unmoved by the relatively "consumer-friendly" as-
pects of the arbitration agreement at issue in AT&T's cell phone contracts.
Among other things, the agreement provided for arbitration in a convenient situs
(where the consumer is billed); arbitration in person, by telephone or online, at the
consumer's choice, for amounts less than $10,000; the availability of injunctive
relief and punitive damages; no right by AT&T to claim attorneys' fees; and an
option to choose small claims court (rather than arbitration). 05 These features did
not, however, dissuade the lower courts from invalidating the class action waiver
(and the underlying agreement to arbitrate) on unconscionability grounds.
In a 5-4 decision, which was only slightly less fragmented than that in
Bazzle, 06 the Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia de-
clared that California's Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA because it
permits consumers to demand class arbitration, which, in his view, is a procedure
that is incompatible with the "fundamental" character of arbitration under the
FAA. 0 7
In concluding that class arbitration was contrary to the "fundamental" charac-
ter of arbitration, Justice Scalia reasoned that "the point of affording parties dis-
cretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined
procedures tailored to the type of dispute." 0 8 In contrast, he said, "class arbitra-
tion requires procedural formality" 0 9 and "the switch from bilateral to class arbi-
tration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural
101. Id. at 1744-45.
102. Id. at 1744.
103. Id. at 1744, n.2.
104. Id. at 1745.
105. Id at 1744., 131 S.Ct.at 1744.
106. The Concepcion opinion was joined by five Justices. The fifth vote was provided, however, by
Justice Thomas, who also concurred. Justice Thomas would have reversed the Ninth Circuit not be-
cause class wide arbitration is contrary to the "fundamental" character of arbitration, but rather because
under his reading of the FAA an agreement to arbitrate must be enforced "unless a party successfully
challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement." Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J.
concurring).
107. Id. at 1748.
108. Id. at 1749.
109. Id. at 1751 (emphasis in onginal).
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morass than final judgment."o10 The Court also thought that "class arbitration
greatly increases risk to defendants" by aggregating claims without providing for
multilayered review."' Given the limited grounds upon which courts can vacate
an arbitral award, the Court concluded, arbitration is "poorly suited to the higher
stakes of class litigation.""l 2 Finally, the Court found it significant that class arbi-
tration did not exist in 1925, when the FAA was enacted - apparently suggesting
that class arbitration was thus inconsistent with "arbitration as envisioned by the
FAA."' B
In sum, Justice Scalia concluded that state law may not require procedures
that are "not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA," and "[r]equiring the availabil-
ity of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration
and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.""l4 The Court therefore
held that the Discover Bank rule "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" and was preempted by
the FAA."'
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer declared that the FAA's purpose is not
"to guarantee these particular procedural advantages," but to treat arbitration on
equal footing as other contracts.116 The dissent reasoned that "California is free to
define unconscionability as it sees fit," and as long as it "applies the same legal
principles to address the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to
address the unconscionability of any other contractual provision, the merits of
class proceedings should not factor into our decision."117 Justice Breyer also ar-
gued that "class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration," and pointed
out that the AAA's amicus brief in Stolt-Nielsen "found class arbitration to be 'a
fair, balanced and efficient means of resolving class disputes.'" 18
C. Reflections on the Supreme Court's Misadventures
On any view, the various opinions in Bazzle, Stolt-Nielsen, and now Concep-
cion make for unhappy reading. As an initial matter, the erratic course of ushering
in class arbitration in Bazzle, followed by largely or entirely ushering it out again
less than a decade later in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, is both a serious institu-
tional failure for the Court and an enormous waste of resources for American
society.
What was the point, and why must parties and taxpayers bear the costs, of the
countless disputes, arbitrations and litigations over the past ten years provoked by
the Court's shifting views? What happens now to the 300 or so AAA class arbi-
110. Id. at 1751 (emphasis in original).
11l. Id. at 1752. The Court said that ordering an arbitration to proceed on a class basis would be as
antithetical to arbitration as ordering parties in an arbitration to incorporate "judicially monitored
discovery," the Federal Rules of Evidence, or "ultimate disposition by a jury." Id. at 1747.
112. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1752.
113. Id. at 1753. The Court also suggested that the California rule could result in fewer companies
choosing to arbitrate, although the factual support for that premise is obscure.
114. Id. at 1748.
115. Id. at 1748 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
116. Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
I17. Id. at 1760.
118. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1758.
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trations which are pending? What weight should parties and lower courts give to
future Supreme Court pronouncements on the FAA - and for how long? The
tortuous and contradictory path of the Supreme Court's decisions on class arbitra-
tion imposed very substantial waste and uncertainty on parties who had concluded
arbitration clauses based on existing judicial precedent.
More generally, the Court's contradictory positions seriously compromise the
legal framework for arbitration in the U.S., leaving businesses, courts and others
with little security about how arbitration agreements will be interpreted and en-
forced in the future. The Court has recognized the high public importance of the
FAA and the legal regime for arbitration in the U.S. - agreeing to review a dis-
proportionate number of arbitration decisions over the past two decades." 9 At the
same time, the Court's shifting and contradictory decisions involving class arbitra-
tion are a striking example of how not to provide a stable and effective framework
for the arbitral process.
This is not a question of whether Bazzle, on the one hand, or Stolt-Nielsen and
Concepcion, on the other hand, was correctly decided; rather, it is a question of
consistency and predictability. In order for arbitration, like other aspects of con-
temporary business, to function effectively, it requires a stable, predictable and
durable legal framework; it does not require, nor benefit from, unyielding juris-
prudential logic and rhetorical display by whatever majority commands the Court
in a particular Term. Appellate courts in other legal systems are able to produce
consistent and predictable bodies of judicial authority on issues of arbitration -
despite substantial diversities of opinion on the same sorts of issues that the U.S.
Supreme Court faces.120  The U.S. legal regime for arbitration would benefit
enormously if the Supreme Court were able to provide comparable consistency
and clarity in this country.
Turning to the Court's interpretation of the FAA in Concepcion, Justice Scal-
ia's opinion would, if taken seriously, erroneously redefine the very concept of
arbitration under the FAA, with potentially serious consequences for U.S. arbitra-
tion law more generally. Most importantly, the Court's declarations about the
supposed "fundamental" character of those arbitrations that are protected by the
FAA are both inaccurate and dangerous: indeed, those declarations threaten the
broader body of U.S. arbitration law.
Specifically, Justice Scalia suggests that the FAA only protects a particular
type of arbitration - the archetype of arbitration supposedly contemplated by
Congress in 1925. On this view, class arbitration is simply "not arbitration as
119. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the FAA establishes a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). Since
1991 the Court has decided more than 20 cases concerning the Federal Arbitration Act, often reversing
lower court rulings disfavoring arbitration. This is a disproportionate number of FAA decisions con-
sidering that the Court otily hears 75-80 cases a year (out of 10,000 certiorari petitions filed each year).
See Supreme Court Website, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
120. The decisions of the French Cour de Cassation, the U.K. Supreme Court and the Swiss Federal
Tribunal all provide examples of national appellate courts that have succeeded in providing a stable
and effective legal regime for arbitration in their respective jurisdictions. See GARY BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 121-31 (2009) (describing the legal regimes of France,
the U.K. and Switzerland).
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envisioned by the FAA," and class arbitration "interferes with fundamental attrib-
utes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."l2'
Justice Scalia's reasoning - which, on its own terms, would withhold FAA
protection from any type of arbitration not envisioned by Congress in 1925 - is
manifestly wrong. Taken at face value, it would mean that all class arbitration
agreements - express, implied or otherwise - would be denied the protections of
Sections 2 and 4 of the FAA, because class arbitration is supposedly not arbitra-
tion at all. On the contrary, on Justice Scalia's view, those arbitration agreements
would be "inconsistent with the FAA."
It is very difficult to imagine that this result, or the reasoning in Concepcion,
are what the Court intended or would hold in future cases; both the result and
reasoning plainly contradict both the express terms of Section 2, which requires
that "agreements to arbitrate" be enforced, and the Court's repeated pronounce-
ments that the FAA "ensur[es] that private arbitration agreements are enforced
according to their terms." 22 Likewise, that conclusion contradicts the fundamen-
tal purpose of the FAA, which is to give effect to parties' agreements to submit
their disputes for final resolution by an arbitrator - which is plainly what a class
arbitration clause does.
Where parties agree to class arbitration, Justice Scalia's suggestion that this
"is not arbitration" - because it is not informal, not bipartite and involves large
stakes - is simply not correct. In fact, contrary to the Court's supposed archetype
of the arbitral process, arbitration has historically taken widely varying forms, in
widely varying settings - ranging from institutional to ad hoc arbitration; from
trade, commercial, religious, community, and international to investor-state arbi-
tration; and from documents only, on-line, or quality arbitrations to arbitrations
resembling trial court litigations. Arbitration has historically encompassed a vast
range of different procedures, depending on the parties' particular objectives and
interests - very often including formal, multiparty, and high stakes dispute resolu-
tion proceedings.
First, arbitration is by no means necessarily informal; rather, arbitration is
aimed first and foremost at ensuring the parties' procedural autonomy. In the
Court's own previous, and accurate, description, "adaptability and access to ex-
pertise are hallmarks of arbitration." 23 Sometimes that adaptability means proce-
dural informality; sometimes it means procedural innovation; and sometimes it
means procedural formality. Arbitrations with a high degree of procedural for-
mality are conducted around the United States, and the world, every day - if that
121. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1748. This line of thought was foreshadowed, at least in part, by Jus-
tice Alito's opinion in Stolt-Nielsen, holding that "the task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a
contract, not to make public policy," and chastising the arbitral tribunal for having "proceeded as if it
had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in
such a situation." Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1767, 1769. This criticism is difficult to follow and ig-
nores the Court's (robust) approval of the arbitrability of antitrust, securities, Title VII and other dis-
putes involving issues of "public policy." See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
(finding dispute under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (finding antitrust claims to be arbitrable); Shear-
son/Amencan Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (finding RICO claims arbitrable);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lanc Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (finding federal employment discrim-
ination claims under Title VII arbitrable).
122. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
123. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 633.
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is what the parties' desire and agree upon.124 Contrary to the Court's suggestions,
there is nothing inherent in arbitration that excludes formality, motions, or com-
plexity.
Remarkably, the Concepcion opinion also declared "[p]arties could agree to
arbitrate pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or pursuant to a discov-
ery process rivaling that in litigation," but that "what the parties in the aforemen-
tioned examples would have agreed to is not arbitration as envisioned by the
FAA."l 25 That too is incorrect, illustrating the broader mistakes in the Court's
analysis.
Arbitration clauses routinely provide for arbitration pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter Federal Rules), or for discovery pursuant to
the Federal Rules.126 Internationally, arbitration agreements routinely incorporate
the International Bar Association's Rules on the Taking of Evidence in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration - providing for disclosure not radically different
from that aspects of the discovery that is available under the Federal Rules.127
Countless other arbitration agreements contain comparable levels of formality,
both with regard to procedures and discovery. Clauses with these sorts of provi-
sions are critical to contemporary business and are routinely enforced by courts, in
the U.S. and elsewhere, every day of the year.128 The idea that the FAA does not
envision or apply to these provisions is flatly wrong.' 29
124. In international arbitration, for example, the parties, in consultation with the tribunal, routinely
decide procedural issues such as the number and sequence of the pleadings, as well as whether to
bifurcate (or even trifurcate) the proceedings. See, e.g., Rule 20 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules ("I.
As early as possible after the constitution of a Tribunal, its President shall cndeavour to ascertain the
views of the parties regarding questions of procedurc...2. In the conduct of the proceeding the Tribunal
shall apply any agreement between the parties on procedural matters[j]").
125. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1752-53.
126. See, e.g., GARY BORN, DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 80 (2006); PAUL
FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 81 (2007).
127. IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, art. 3(3) (relating
to requests for the production of documents), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications
/publicationsIBA guides and free materials.aspx.
128. See, e.g., Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, 281 Fed.Appx. 482, 485 (6th
Cir. 2008) (upholding arbitration clause that, inter alia, mandated discovery "conducted pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); Bhim v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1314
(S.D.Fla.,2009) (upholding an arbitration agreement that provided for depositions, document requests,
and subpoenas, as well as additional discovery if ordered by the arbitrator for good cause); Amgen Inc.
v. Kidney Center of Del. Cnty., Ltd., 879 F.Supp. 878, (N.D.ll. 1995) (enforcing a subpoena for
documents and deposition testimony when the parties "agreed to arbitrate their dispute pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); Jardine Lloyd Thompson Canada Inc. v. Western Oil Sands Inc.,
[2006] 264 D.L.R. 4th 358, para. 27 (Can. Alta. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that by virtue of the parties'
arbitration agreement the arbitral tribunal did have power to order non-parties to produce documents
and submit to pre-hearing discovery); Martin Hunter, The Procedural Powers ofArbitrators under the
English Act 1996, 13 ARB. INT'L 345, 350 (1997) ("Discovery forms a part of arbitration proceedings
only when there is an express or implied agreement of the parties, or when the tribunal orders it in the
exercise of its discretion."); ENGLISH ARBITRATION ACT, 1996, §1(b) ("The parties should be free to
agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public
interest"); Id. §34(1) ("It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, sub-
ject to the right of the parties to agree any matter."); Id §43(1) ("A party to arbitral proceedings may
use the same court procedures as are available in relation to legal proceedings to secure the attendance
before the tribunal of a witness in order to give oral testimony or to produce documents or other mate-
rial evidence.").
129. See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) ("the FAA lets
parties tailor some, even many features of arbitration by contract, including the way arbitrators are
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Second, contrary to the Court's stated views, there is nothing inherent in arbi-
tration that limits it to small stakes. On the contrary, enormous disputes have
always been, and still are, decided in arbitration. Justice Breyer's dissent pointed
out a few recent examples of high stakes arbitrations.130 There are, in fact, nu-
merous, famous, high-stakes arbitrations: the IBM/Fujitsu arbitration (involving,
in the 1980s, billions of dollars),' 3 ' the 1980's Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (which
adjudicated many billions of dollars in claims, by both private and government
parties),132 the 1990s Andersen Consulting arbitration (where the claim exceeded
$14 billion),13 3 and the 19th century Alabama Arbitration (where the U.S. recov-
ered an amount from the United Kingdom equal to its annual government budg-
et). 134 There are also hundreds of currently pending domestic and international
commercial and investment arbitrations listed each year in the American Lawyer,
most involving amounts well in excess of $1 billion.135 Justice Scalia's concep-
tion of arbitration as inherently involving small stakes is unrelated to the actual
practice of arbitration in contemporary life.
Third, again contrary to the Court's stated views in Concepcion, arbitration
need not be bipartite. On the contrary, it is frequently conducted among multiple
parties. The International Chambers of Commerce reports that approximately a
third of its cases are multiparty disputes,' 3 6 while entire books are written on the
subject of multiparty arbitration.' 3 7  Equally, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was
vested with authority to decide large numbers of small claims (less than $250,000)
in multi-party proceedings, with the claimants' home state acting on their be-
chosen, what their qualifications should be, which issues are arbitrable, along with procedure and
choice of substantive law."); Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd's of London, 549 F.3d
210, 217 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Where agreements so provide, [an arbitrator's] authority includes the power
to order discovery from the parties in arbitration since 'the FAA lets parties tailor some, even many
features of arbitration by contract, including . .. procedure."') (quoting Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S.
at 586); Chiarella v. Viscount Indus. Co., Ltd., No. 92 Civ. 9310(RPP), 1993 WL 497967, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1993) (finding that "[t]he scope of an arbitration panel's authority is determined by
the terms of the arbitration agreement" and determining that the arbitrator's discovery orders were
permitted by the AAA arbitration rules to which the parties had agreed).
130. 131 S.Ct. at 1760.
131. See Robert H. Mnookin, Creating Value through Process Design, II J. INT'L ARB. 125, 125-32
(1994).
132. According to the U.S. Department of State, the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal has resolved approxi-
mately 4000 private claims, resulting in awards totaling more than $2.5 billion to U.S. nationals and
companies. Significant claims between the two governments remain to be resolved by the tribunal.
See http://www.state.gov/s/l/3199.htm.
133. See The Andersen Arbitration, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 437 (1999).
134. Great Britain was ordered to pay, and did pay, the equivalent of $15.5 million in gold for violat-
ing its neutrality in the U.S. Civil War and having permitted the outfitting of a Confederate privateer
that caused substantial damage to Union shipping. See Thomas W. Balch, THE ALABAMA
ARBITRATION (1900).
135. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard: Contract Disputes, AM. LAW. (July 2011)
(listing over sixty arbitrations with $1 billion or more in dispute, including one case with $20 billion in
dispute).
136. See ICC 2010 Statistical Report, at p.2 .
137. See, e.g., MULTIPARTY ARBITRATION (Bernard Hanotiau and Eric Schwartz eds., 2010);
MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CONSENT PROCEDURE AND
ENFORCEMENT (Belinda Macmahon ed., 2009).
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half.138 There is simply nothing in the history or practice of arbitration that even
remotely suggests that it must involve only two parties.139
Fourth, Concepcion's suggestion that arbitration is somehow limited to what
Congress envisioned in 1925 is also impossible to accept. Arbitration in the 21st
century has no necessary resemblance to that in 1925 - nor should it. Arbitration
has historically evolved and been tailored to respond to economic, social and
technological developments. As a consequence, contemporary arbitration now
routinely addresses statutory claims (under legislation enacted decades after
1925),140 using telecommunications, on-line and other technologies (developed
decades after 19 2 5 ),141 dealing with commercial businesses and industries (again,
developed decades after the FAA was enacted).142
Although the irony was apparently lost on the Court, the bipartite arbitration
agreement at issue in Concepcion itself, which Justice Scalia was so anxious to
protect as an archetypal arbitration clause, contained an elaborate, formal proce-
dural regime that provided for on-line or telephonic consumer arbitration of cell
phone disputes involving multiple statutory claims.143  That arbitration clause
contemplated arbitrations using procedural means unknown in 1925, to resolve
statutory claims that had not been imagined in 1925, about a technology that
would not be invented for decades after 1925. Ironically, it is fairly clear that the
bipartite arbitration agreement the Court was ostensibly protecting under the FAA
in Concepcion would not itself have satisfied Justice Scalia's demand that arbitra-
tion in 2011 be the same as that in 1925.
In fact, Concepcion's suggestion that the FAA only envisioned a particular
kind of informal, small stakes, bipartite arbitration of the sort supposedly conduct-
ed in the 1920s is again patently incorrect. There is nothing at all in the FAA sug-
gesting that Congress intended only to protect arbitrations as they were being
138. See CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL 116-18 (1998).
139. Professor S.I. Strong notes that courts and commentators are no longer skeptical of multiparty
arbitrations. See S.1 Strong, Does Class Arbitration "Change the Nature" of Arbitration? Stoll-
Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012).
Professor Strong also compares the traits of class arbitration and multiparty arbitrations, concluding
that these two modes of arbitration differ in only two respects - relief sought and underlying policy
considerations - and that these differences do not necessarily alter the nature of arbitration. Id.
140. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstatc/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (finding that Title VII
claims arc arbitrable).
141. See, eg., Article 8 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (at
the discretion of the tribunal, a witness may appear at an evidentiary hearing by videoconference),
available at http://www.ibanct.org/Publications/publicationsIBA guides and frec materials.aspx.
142. Indeed, the rise of patent arbitration makes it certain that arbitration will often play a pivotal role
in disputes involving high tech industries See e.g. Cordia Corp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., Civ A. No. H-92-
1623, 1993 WL 723844 (S.D. Tex Mar. 11, 1993) (regarding an arbitration between medical device
manufacturers disputing a patent to a balloon catheter used in angioplasty procedures). 35 U.S.C. §
294 and other statutes encouraging patent arbitration were enacted in the 1980s. See AAA Patent
Arbitration Rules (Introduction), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.aspid=22013#lntroduction. Of
course, there are also many non-patent arbitrations involving businesses and industries that did not
exist in 1925. See e.g. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal.4th 362 (1994) (concerning
an arbitration involving a contract dispute between computer chip manufacturers).
143. The claims in the case were based on three separate Califomia statutes, and the ATT website
provided the forms for filing a Notice of Dispute and Demand for Arbitration. See Laster v. T-Mobile
USA Inc., No. 05cvl 167 DMS (AJB) 2008 WL 5216255, at *1, 3 (S.D. Cal Aug. 11, 2008).
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conducted in 1925 - and that view would conflict squarely with Congress' objec-
tives of encouraging arbitration as a flexible, efficient alternative to litigation.
Finally, the claim in Concepcion that class arbitration is not really arbitration
is also contrary to all available definitions of arbitration,1" including the Court's
own prior definitious145 _ all of which Justice Scalia omitted even to mention in
his discursion on the "fundamental" nature of arbitration. Those definitions have
none of the limitations that Justice Scalia relies upon and, on the contrary, are
expansive and catholic in their reach.146 That is, of course, hardly surprising in
light of the extraordinary variety and diversity that arbitration has historically
exhibited.
In summary, if it were given effect, Justice Scalia's view about the "funda-
mental" character of arbitration is as dangerous as it is misinformed. Taken at
face value, the suggestion that the FAA protects only a particular historical con-
ception of arbitration - involving informal, small, bipartite disputes between local
merchants - threatens to radically limit the meaning and effect of the FAA. It
144. See, e.g., Martin Domke, Larry Edmonson & Gabriel M Wilner, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 1:1 ("Arbitration is a process by which parties voluntarily refer their disputes to an
impartial third person (an arbitrator) selected by them for a decision based on the evidence and argu-
ments to be presented before the arbitration tribunal."); Jill 1. Gross , Securities Mediation: Dispute
Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 329, 358 (2006) (providing the
following definition of arbitration: "(1) the parties choose to have a dispute or disputes decided by a
third party, called an arbitrator; (2) the parties choose the arbitrator or a method for his or her selection;
(3) the arbitrator hears the dispute; (4) the arbitrator makes a binding award; (5) the arbitrator's deci-
sion is, subject to very limited grounds of review, final and enforceable by State law in the same man-
ner as a judgment") (citing IAN MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 7-8 (1992)); GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 63-64 (2009) ("[1]ntemational commercial arbitration is a means by which international
business disputes can be definitively resolved, pursuant to the parties' agreement, by independent, non-
governmental decision-makers, selected by or for the parties, applying neutral judicial procedures that
provide the parties an opportunity to be heard."); NIGEL BLACKABY, CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES,
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1-2
(2009) (In an arbitration, "[p]arties who are in dispute agree to submit their disagreement to a person
whose expertise or judgment they trust . . . who listens, considers the facts and the arguments, and then
makes a ... final and binding [decision]; and it is binding because the parties have agreed that it should
be, rather than because of the coercive power of any State."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009) (defining arbitration as a "method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral parties
who are usually agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding"); American Arbitra-
tion Association ("Arbitration is the submission of a dispute to one or more impartial persons for a




145. Ironically, in a prior case, the Court relied on a broad definition of arbitration when finding that a
statutory procedure did not qualify as arbitration. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,
382 (2002) (stating that "arbitration occurs when 'parties in dispute choose a judge to render a final
and binding decision on the merits of the controversy and on the basis of proofs presented by the
parties."') (quoting 1 1. MacNeil, R. Speidel, & T. Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law § 2.1.1
(1995)).
146. See, e.g, GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 227-28 (2009) (cataloging
the expansive view that courts have taken, both under the FAA and in foreign common and civil law
jurisdictions, of the definition of arbitration); Strong, supra note 139 (addressing the difficulties in
defining the nature of arbitration in part due to the wide variety of procedures possible); David St. John
Sutton, Judith Gill & Matthew Gearing, RUSSEL ON ARBITRATION § 1:2 ("[p]erhaps the absence of an
accepted definition of arbitration, which encompasses its many facets but precludes other forms of
dispute resolution, simply demonstrates the diverse scope of the subject.").
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would, applied in a principled fashion, very likely exclude arbitration of most
statutory claims (that did not exist in 1925) from the FAA's protections, as well as
consumer arbitration and on-line arbitration (that also did not exist in the 1920s).
Equally, if taken seriously, Justice Scalia's view would deny the FAA's protec-
tions to arbitration agreements requiring any appreciable level of procedural for-
mality (e.g., discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules and motions procedures).
Indeed, the various aspects of Justice Scalia's conception of arbitration are eerily
reminiscent of some 19 th century judicial decisions, which treated arbitration as a
second class form of rough justice suitable only for limited types of disputes and,
as a consequence, subject to strict judicial supervision.147
Hopefully, Concepcion's erroneous conception of arbitration will remain but
a rhetorical extravagance that does not further confuse the development of arbitra-
tion law under the FAA or elsewhere. It is very difficult to imagine that the Court
would ever refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate because the parties had
agreed to formal procedures, multiparty proceedings or forms of dispute resolu-
tion not common in 1925. For the moment, however, Justice Scalia's analysis
represents that of the Court, binding in both state and federal courts, and the risk
that it will be given effect by lower court judges is a very real one.148
147. In Tobey v. County ofBristol, Justice Story found that:
It is certainly the policy of the common law, not to compel men to submit their rights and inter-
ests to arbitration, or to enforce agreements for such purpose. Nay, the common law goes farther,
and even if a submission has been made to arbitrators, who are named, by deed or otherwise,
with an express stipulation, that the submission shall be irrevocable, it is still revocable and coun-
termandable, by either party, before the award is actually made, although not afterwards.
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F.Cas 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). Justice Story justified this
supposed hostility of the common law toward arbitration as follows:
[A] court of equity ought not to compel a party to submit the decision of his rights to a tribunal,
which confessedly, does not possess full, adequate, and complete means, within itself, to investi-
gate the merits of the case, and to administer justice.... Now we all know, that arbitrators, at the
common law, possess no authority whatsoever, even to administer an oath, or to compel the at-
tendane of witnesses. They cannot compel the production of documents, and papers and books
of account, or insist upon a discovery of facts from the parties under oath. They are not ordinari-
ly well enough acquainted with the pnnciples of law and equity, to administer effectually, in
complicated cases; and hence it has been said that the judgment of arbitrators is but rusticum ju-
dicium. Ought then a court of equity to compel a resort to such a tnbunal, by which, however
honest and intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal or equitable rights of the parties
can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?
Id. at 1320-21.
148. It was precisely to overcome the hostility of decisions like that of Justice Story in Tobey v
County of Bristol that, according to the Southland Court, Congress passed the FAA. Southland Corp.,
465 U.S. at 14 (in passing the FAA, Congress addressed the problem of "old common law hostility
toward arbitration"). Justice Scalia's views regarding the nature of arbitration have, unfortunately,
already been quoted in international arbitration. In his dissenting opinion in Abaclat and Others v
Argentina, supra note 3, Georges Abi-Saab quotes approvingly Justice Scalia's view that in arbitration
"[t]he absence of multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected. That risk of
error may become unacceptable when damages allegedly owed to thousands of claimants are aggregat-
ed and decided at once. Arbitration is poorly suited to these higher stakes." Abaclat and Others v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab, 153 (Aug. 4, 2011)
(quoting Concepczon, 131 S.Ct. at 1751).
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More broadly, the analysis in Concepcion raises the same concerns of pre-
dictability and institutional responsibility that arise from the unhappy trilogy of
splintered opinions in Bazzle, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion. One can accept the
premise that it is unlikely that the Court will ever apply the analysis adopted in
Concepcion - avoiding the damage that this analysis would do to U.S. arbitration
law. But that raises the more fundamental question of how the Court can fulfill its
institutional responsibilities if its opinions continue to reflect the views of individ-
ual Justices, often diverging substantially and unpredictably from existing prece-
dent on basic analytical issues, with limited and uncertain weight in future cases.
Given the importance of arbitration to contemporary commercial and other affairs
in the U.S., the Court owes American businesses and taxpayers a more durable,
predictable and consistent view of the FAA. Again, appellate courts in other j u-
risdictions have succeeded in providing such a framework for the arbitral process
- as the U.S. Supreme Court also did in the era of Prima Paint, Scherk and
Mitsubishi Motors. There is no reason that the Court could not do so, once again,
and its Members' collective failure to accomplish this is a serious and costly insti-
tutional failure.
D. The Court's Misconception ofArbitration Is Unnecessary
to the Result in Concepcion
Ironically, the result reached by the Court in Concepcion could have been ar-
rived at in a sensible manner, without threatening to limit the scope and protec-
tions of the FAA. Concepcion could very readily, and correctly, have been decid-
ed on the basis that the California Supreme Court's Discover Bank rule is
preempted because it does not comply with Section 2 - providing that arbitration
agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable," subject only to a "saving
clause" for generally-applicable contract law defenses that apply to "the revoca-
tion of any contract."1 4 9 Contrary to Section 2's requirements, the "unconsciona-
bility" rule announced in Discover Bank does not treat arbitration agreements as
valid and enforceable, but instead invalidates them - on the basis of a rule not
designed for or applicable to contracts generally.
The Discover Bank rule clearly did not accord with Section 2's basic re-
quirement that arbitration agreements are "valid, irrevocable and enforceable."
Instead of treating AT&T's arbitration agreements - which provided expressly
and only for bipartite arbitration - as valid and enforceable, the Discover Bank
rule did the opposite. It expressly invalidated a central provision of those agree-
ments (the class action waiver) and required either litigation or a form of arbitra-
tion not provided for, and expressly excluded, by the parties' agreement. That
indisputably violated the basic requirements in Section 2 and 4 of the FAA, that
arbitration agreements be enforced in accordance with their terms.
The disputed issue in Concepcion was instead whether, as Justice Breyer's
dissent concluded, the Discover Bank rule was nonetheless permitted by the FAA
because it was a generally-applicable rule of contract law, applicable to all con-
tracts within the meaning of Section 2's savings clause. On this question, the
proper interpretation of Section 2's savings clause is that it does not rescue the
149. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011) (emphasis added).
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asserted rule of "unconscionability" adopted by the California courts in Discover
Bank.
The Discover Bank rule was tailored for, and specifically directed, only to
class action waivers, in both arbitration and forum selection (choice of court)
agreements. Under that rule, class actions waivers in both arbitration and forum
selection clauses are invalid whenever they involve adhesion contracts, multiple
small claims and an alleged scheme to defraud consumers;'50 no further inquiry
into the generally-applicable criteria of unconscionability is required to invalidate
a class action waiver under Discover Bank.
As such, the Discover Bank rule was not a generally applicable rule of con-
tract law, applicable to "any contract," as required by Section 2's savings clause.
Rather, the rule created a special, unique standard of invalidity, not requiring any
showing of traditional unconscionability factors, that was necessarily applicable to
only class action waivers and not to other contractual provisions (i.e., the price,
delivery, warranty and other provisions of consumer contracts, which were not,
and never could be, affected by the Discover Bank rule). 5' Because the Califor-
nia rule automatically applied only to this fairly narrow sub-set of contractual
provisions, it was not, as demanded by Section 2, an unconscionability rule gener-
ally applicable to all contracts. It was, instead, a specially tailored rule applicable
only to class action waivers. As such, the Discover Bank rule was not rescued by
Section 2's savings clause and is instead preempted by the requirement of Sec-
tions 2 and 4 that arbitration agreements be enforced in accordance with their
terms.
Contrary to Justice Breyer's dissent, the fact that the Discover Bank rule ap-
plied to both forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements does not bring it
within Section 2's savings clause. That conclusion is clear from a few examples.
A state law that invalidated all agreements to resolve disputes in either out-of-
state courts or out-of-state arbitrations would be preempted by Section 2 no less
than a law that invalidated only agreements to arbitrate in an out-of-state location.
Similarly, a state law that required all forum selection and arbitration clauses to be
signed separately, or to be re-affirmed by both parties after a dispute arose, would
violate Section 2 no less than a law that imposed these requirements only on arbi-
tration agreements. Likewise, a state law that invalidated any forum selection
clause or arbitration agreement as applied to disputes below (or above) a specified
monetary sum would again plainly violate Section 2, once more, no less than a
provision applying only to arbitration agreements. The fact that the Discover
Bank rule also invalidates class action waivers in forum selection agreements does
nothing to save it, as applied to arbitration agreements, under Section 2.
Justice Breyer's dissent was also wrong to rely on the fact that the Discover
Bank rule applied to only some class action waivers.' 52 The essential point is that
the Discover Bank rule invalidated the provisions of arbitration agreements that
are plainly subject to the FAA. The fact that the rule might have invalidated a
150. Discover Bank, 36 Cal.4th at 162-63.
151. Id. at 162-63.
152. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1756-57.
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broader range of class action waivers does nothing to alter its effects on those
waivers to which it applies.'
Moreover, as already noted, the Discover Bank rule applied a flat rule of un-
enforceability to a substantial subset of all class action waivers - invalidating all
class actions waivers in adhesion contracts in cases involving claims of fraud
seeking small amounts of damages, without any further requirement for proof of
traditional indicia of unconscionability. Although denominated "unconscionabil-
ity," the California rule was in fact an automatic rule of invalidity directed at a
defined, and fairly substantial, set of arbitration and forum selection agreements.
Thus, the Discover Bank rule is precisely the type of state law invalidation of
arbitration agreements that the FAA has repeatedly been held to prohibit. As ap-
plied in Concepcion, the Discover Bank rule required resolution of a defined cate-
gory of disputes (involving specified types of fraud claims arising from particular
types of contract) in a different forum from the bipartite arbitral forum agreed to
by the parties. Specifically, following Stolt-Nielsen, the Discover Bank rule re-
quires that disputes which are subject to bipartite arbitration agreements nonethe-
less be brought in class action litigation.1 54
The application of the Discover Bank rule in this manner is substantively
identical to typical state law non-arbitrability rules which have routinely been
struck down under the FAA - such as requirements that all state securities law or
franchise disputes be resolved in state courts or before state administrative tribu-
nals.'5 5 Like those requirements, the Discover Bank prohibition is also preempted
by Sections 2 and 4 of the FAA.
This conclusion would be no different if the Ninth Circuit in Concepcion had
applied the Discover Bank rule to require class arbitration, rather than class litiga-
tion. 5 6 Just as Sections 2 and 4 of the FAA do not permit states to require class
litigation of particular categories of disputes, they also do not permit states to
require class arbitrations that the parties have not accepted in their agreement to
arbitrate. This conclusion does not rest on any judgment that class arbitration is
not true "arbitration"; it rests on the fact that the Discover Bank rule requires par-
ties to arbitrate in a manner to which they have not agreed - an obvious breach of
153. A state law rule providing for the invalidity of any agreement to arbitrate state securities law
claims in excess of $50,000 would be preempted no less than a rule invalidating all such arbitration
agreements. A state law rule requiring that arbitration clauses in all real estate or all distribution
agreements be in capital letters or be reaffirmed after a dispute arises would be preempted no less than
a rule imposing such requirements on all arbitration agreements.
154. As discussed above, Stolt-Nielsen required an affirmative and likely express agreement provid-
ing for class arbitration before permitting class arbitration to be compelled. See supra Section Ill.A. It
is clear that agreements like the AT&T arbitration agreement do not - even after invalidating their
class action waivers - provide affirmatively for class arbitration. Thus, after Stolt-Nielsen, when a
class action waiver was invalidated under the Discover Bank rule, the only available remedy would be
to order class litigation. See, e.g., Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 140-41 (2d Cir.
2010); Ruhl v. Lee's Summit Honda, 322 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2010); see also Rau, supra note 64, at p. 80
(PDF version).
155. These types of restrictions have been impermissible since the Court's decision in Southland. See
supra Section I.A.
156. Preliminarily, any such conclusion would be precluded by Stolt-Nielsen, which required a clear
affirmative agreement before parties could be compelled to participate in a class arbitration. Here,
there was absolutely no suggestion that the AT&T arbitration agreement affirmatively provided for
class arbitration; on the contrary, it did the opposite. This fact alone would have been sufficient to
reject arguments that class arbitration could have been required under the AT&T arbitration clause.
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Section 2's basic requirement that the parties' agreements to arbitrate "shall be
valid, irrevocable and enforceable."
The same conclusion would apply equally to a state law requirement that all
arbitrations be conducted only in a local, in-state seat (regardless what the parties'
agreement on arbitral seat provided), that all arbitrations be conducted before a
sole arbitrator (regardless what the parties' agreement provided about the number
of arbitrators), or that all arbitrations include either broad discovery or an in-
person evidentiary hearing (again, regardless what the parties had agreed). In
each case, there is nothing in the "fundamental" character of arbitration that is
inconsistent with arbitrations being conducted in any particular place, before a
sole arbitrator or with discovery or a live evidentiary hearing. Arbitrations are
conducted in such places, before sole arbitrators, and with discovery and live hear-
ings all the time. Rather, in each case, imposing such a requirement by state law
would offend Sections 2 and 4 of the FAA because it would force parties to con-
duct an arbitration in a manner to which they had not agreed. Those requirements
- like the Discover Bank rule requiring parties to arbitrate in a manner to which
they have not agreed - would violate the FAA's basic rule of party autonomy.
Despite these relatively straightforward answers to Concepcion, the U.S. Su-
preme Court embarked on an unnecessary and ill-informed discourse on the sup-
posedly "fundamental" character of the arbitral process and the FAA's supposed
concern with the character of arbitration in 1925. That discourse was wrong and
should be ignored, lest it cause yet further damage to the fabric of American arbi-
tration law.
The Court's misadventures with class arbitration are unfortunate and unset-
tling. Its tortuous path of contradictory decisions has caused immense waste and
uncertainty, while the Concepcion analysis would, if taken at face value, threaten
even greater damage to the body and stature of American arbitration law more
generally. Against this background, one can only wonder what the Court will say
next about arbitration. And, regrettably, one can only hope that - unless the Court
begins to take its institutional responsibilities more seriously - we will have to
wait a long time to hear.
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